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CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY AND MENTAL CAPACITY
UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE
Frank D. Winston*
Congress, in May 1950, enacted a Uniform Code of Military Justice'
applicable to all branches of the Armed Forces. Since that time, the rules
and standards governing the defense of insanity have been uniformly
interpreted in the military courts.2 This is significant when considered
in relation to the controversy in civilian jurisdictions since the case of
Durham v. United States3 in 1954. This uniformity of interpretation re-
sulted because the Manual for Courts-Martial, which is the guide for
practice and rules of evidence under the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
established the test of insanity as a hybrid form of the M'Naghten Rule
and the irresistible impulse test.
THE MENTAL RESPONSIBILITY TEST
The test for mental responsibility under the Manual is, simply
stated, "whether the accused was at the time of the alleged offense so
far free from mental defect, disease or derangement as to be able,
concerning the particular acts charged, to distinguish right from wrong
and to adhere to the right. ' ' 4
The word "wrong" implies that the accused must know the community
(the military, society in general) considers the act wrongful.5 An accused's
belief that an act is morally right, although he realizes its legal wrong-
fulness, does not constitute a defense.6
The Manual sets the tone for the military court's interpretation of
lack of mental responsibility.
* LL.B., Georgtown University, LL.M., New York University. A member of the
California State Bar and the District of Columbia Bar, he is currently employed by the
United States Government as a teacher in the University of Maryland Extension
Program in Germany.
1 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1958).
2 Formerly each branch of the service was the final authority over establishment and
interpretation of its respective law. For the Army and Air Force, this was the Articles
of War, for the Navy and Coast Guard, it was the Articles of Government of the Navy.
As an example, prior to 1951, the Navy did not recognize "irresistible impulse" as a
defense, while the Army, Air Force and Coast Guard did.
3 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Durham rule relieves the accused of criminal
responsibility where his act was a product of mental deficiency or disease.
4 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 120b.
5 Department of the Army Technical Manual 8-240, para. 4; Department of the Air
Force Manual 160-42, May 1953.
6 United States v. Smith, 10 C.M.R. 350 (1953), 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R.
314 (1954).
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The phrase 'mental defect, disease, or derangement' comprehends
those irrational states of mind which are the result of deteriora-
tion, destruction or malfunction of the mental as distinguished
from the moral faculties. To constitute lack of mental responsi-
bility the impairment must not only be the result of mental defect,
disease, or derangement but must also completely deprive the
accused of his ability to distinguish right from wrong or to
adhere to the right as to the act charged. Thus a mere defect of
character, will power, or behavior, as manifested by one or more
offenses, ungovernable passion, or otherwise, does not necessarily
indicate insanity, even though it may demonstrate a diminution
or impairment in ability to adhere to the right in respect to the
act charged.
7
IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE
It is evident the accused must not only be able to distinguish right
from wrong, he must be able to adhere to the right. As pointed out in
United States v. Trede s while the test does not mention the word "irre-
sistable," the Court of Military Appeals has construed paragraph 120b
to mean practically the same as the irresistible impulse test in civil
jurisdictions. As a matter of law, however, the phrase "irresistible impulse"
should be omitted wholly from instructions to the court-martial.'
To be available as a defense, the irresistible impulse must stem from
mental disease or derangement; moral deterioration or a mental condition
is not enough. The defense of irresistible impulse therefore, is not in
issue where the evidence goes no further than to establish that an
accused's ability to adhere to the right was impaired.10
In the Kunak case 1 the court analyzed and accepted two similar tests
as being applicable to measure irresistible impulse in military law. The
first is referred to as the "policeman at the elbow" test; i.e., the accused
cannot be said to have acted under an irresistible impulse if he would
not have committed the act had there been a policeman present. The
other standard is that the accused would not have committed the act
had the circumstances been such that immediate detection and apprehen-
sion were certain. The theory is that no impulse that can be resisted in the
presence of a high risk of detection or apprehension is really irresistible.
Interestingly enough a case did arise where the policeman might be
said to have been "at the elbow.'1 2 The accused was convicted of un-
premeditated murder. There were air police in the area, but a psychiatrist
7 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 120b.
8 2 U.S.C.M.A. 581, 10 C.M.R. 79 (1953).
9 United States v Smith, 10 C.M.R. 350 (1953), 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R.
314 (1954).
10 United States v. Sommerville, 19 C.M.R. 655 (1955).
11 United States v. Kunak, 17 C.M.R. 346 (1954).
12 United States v. Redmond, 15 C.M.R. 703 (1954).
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testified that the accused would not have committed the offense if an air
policeman had been more immediately present. The conviction was upheld.
The reason the defense of insanity was not honored was primarily that
the accused's record did not disclose any disease, defect or derangement.
It showed only that he was drunk at the time, and policemen were in
the vicinity.
DERANGEMENT OR DISEASE
The Dunn case' s is an excellent illustration of the requirement of
derangement or disease. The accused was found guilty of indecent acts
with male children under the age of sixteen years. The defense adduced
testimony of a psychiatrist, duly qualified as an expert, that at the time
of the commission of the offenses alleged the accused could not distinguish
right from wrong, nor was he able to adhere to the right. However,
questioning of the witness indicated that the accused did not suffer from
any "acute psychotic episodes" at the time of the offenses nor did he
ever depart from reality during that period. This witness also testified
that in his opinion the accused would have been able to resist an impulse
to commit the acts in question had the circumstances been different (e.g.,
if the parents of any of the boys or an air policeman had been present).
The witness further stated that the accused was suffering from a func-
tional emotional illness which had no organic basis and that he was not
emotionally capable of aiding in his defense.
On the other hand, other psychiatrists testified that the accused did
understand the nature of the proceedings against him; that he could
cooperate in his own defense; and that at the time of the commission of
the offenses he was able to adhere to the right, even though his ability
was impaired by a psychiatric condition, i.e., sexual deviation manifested
by homosexuality. Under these facts the finding of mental responsibility
by the court was sustained on appeal.
THE DURHAM RULE
The Durham rule has of course been presented by defense counsel in
the military, but without success. The leading case of United States v.
Smith '4 clearly rejects the rule. The remarks in the opinion do not seem
to limit themselves, however, to the issue of diseased mind and mental or
moral responsibility. Here the court considered what the consequences
would be if the rule were to become the accepted standard in the military.
The Court of Military Appeals found that the Durham rule was too
uncertain. The opinion offered very excellent and detailed observations
by Judge Brosman on t!,, pitfalls of Durham in general. Then, with
13 United States v. Dunn, 9 C.M.R. 703 (1953).
14 10 C.M.R. 350 (1953), 5 U.S.C.M.A. 314, 17 C.M.R. 314 (1954).
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reference to the military, he stated that under Durham the premium on
malingering is enhanced. Since adequate psychiatric facilities for detecting
the malingerer may not be readily available in the military, Durham
would place the offender in a distinct and unfair advantage. The court
also pointed out that the premium on a resort to the defense of insanity
is higher in the military because no more than a reasonable doubt of
sanity is required to acquit the accused, and because commitment does
not automatically result in a finding of not guilty based on insanity.
In addition, the court said that an acquittal would be a pleasant means
of exit from the Armed Forces with a type of discharge carrying relatively
little social stigma and at the same time preserving full veterans' privileges.
It is somewhat surprising that Durham has not succeeded in the
military, since the District of Columbia is the background for many
precedents for military law, and the Court of Military Appeals is generally
assiduous in protecting rights of an accused.
1 5
RAISING THE ISSUE
Ordinarily, the defense counsel will raise the question of the accused's
responsibility, and when indicated, will ask for the necessary psychiatric
examination. Military psychiatrists are available to the accused if he so
desires. Moreover, the trial counsel and the members of the court-martial
also have the duty to guard the accused's rights and will call for evidence
in this regard whenever it appears indicated in the interest of justice. 6
As a practical matter, the issue of sanity may be challenged by testi-
mony of both lay and expert witnesses. However, the mere fact that a
witness testified that an accused has a mental disease will not, in every
case raise the issue of legal insanity. The issue is not merely whether
the accused has a mental disease, defect or derangement, but rather
whether on the whole record reasonable minds might conclude that be-
cause of some mental defect, disease or derangement, the accused was
unable, concerning the particular acts charged, to distinguish right from
wrong or adhere to the right. Where the evidence most favorable to the
accused only indicates that his ability to adhere to the right was weakened
or impaired, the issue of legal insanity is not raised.1
CAPACITY TO STAND TRIAL
Insanity is also an issue as to the accused's capacity to stand trial.
Technically, the matter is not a proper subject for a motion to dismiss.18
15 For a current list of jurisdictions which have rejected Durham, see Blocker v.
United States, 288 F.2d 853, 866 n. 22 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
16 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 122a.
17 United States v. Sommerville, 19 C.M.R. 655 (1955).
18 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 67, 68a.
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The proper procedure is a motion for a stay of proceedings or continuance
due to mental incapacity of the accused to stand trial.,,
Upon this issue there is a different test for mental capacity than for
mental responsibility. The mental capacity issue inquires into whether the
accused has the mental ability to understand the nature of the proceedings
against him and to intelligently conduct or cooperate in his own defense.
This phrase is interpreted to mean that if the individual is capable of
cooperating reasonably with counsel, he possess the requisite degree of
mental capacity. There is no requirement that the lack of capacity be the
result of a mental disease, defect or derangement.2o
Mental capacity must relate to his capacity at the time of the trial
or preparation for trial. The theory that it is unjust to prosecute one
while he be incapable of cooperating in his own defense does not provide
a permanent bar to prosecution where the real handicap in defending is
merely that the accused cannot remember what happened.2 1 The right
to dismissal must grow out of a serious mental disturbance at the time
of trial which, in good conscience, would require that legal proceedings
be stayed and the action disposed of through administrative channels.
As spelled out by the Court of Military Appeals, the test of mental
capacity is:
Whether the prisoner at this time is possessed of sufficient
mental power, and has such understanding of his situation, such
coherency of ideas, control of his mental faculties, and the requi-
site power of memory, as will enable him to testify in his own
behalf, if he so desires, and otherwise to properly and intelli-
gently aid his counsel in making a rational defense.2
An example of a situation which failed to impress a court was the
case of United States v. Shipley.23 Prior to entering the accused's plea in
that case, the defense counsel moved that an inquiry be had as to the
mental capacity of the accused. The man was charged with the com-
mission of indecent acts with boys who were under sixteen years. Upon
questioning by the law officer, the defense counsel conceded that he had
no evidence to present to the court in support of his motion, but he felt
that anyone who would do the acts alleged in the specifications would
be abnormal and that such abnormality might or might not be insanity.
Thereafter, the law officer read to the court all pertinent portions of
subparagraphs 112a and b, Manual for Courts-Martial, and, having
determined that the defense counsel had had adequate time to prepare
the defense of the accused, ruled, subject to objection by any member
10 United States v. Moore, 14 C.M.R. 658 (1953).
20 United States v. Williams, 14 C.M.R. 242 (1953), 5 U.S.M.C.A. 197, 17 C.M.R.
197 (1954).
21 United States v. Lopez-Malave, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 341, 15 C.M.R. 341 (1954).
22 United States v. Williams, 14 C.M.R. 242 (1953), 5 U.S.C.M.A. 197, 17 C.M.R.
197, at 206 (1954).
23 14 C.M.R. 343 (1954).
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of the court, that the motion was denied. No member of the court objected.
The ruling was sustained by the Board of Review. Thus, although
disease need not be shown, some disorder existing at the time of trial
must be raised by the evidence to require an inquiry into insanity.
A finding of lack of mental capacity at the time of trial is not a finding
on the merits. Upon this finding, the case is returned to the Convening
Authority who will then determine whether to dismiss the charges if the
incapacity is permanent, or suspend the proceedings until the accused
regains capacity to stand trial. It may also, if dissatisfied with the
findings of the court, require further examination of the accused, or even
refer the matter back to the court for reconsideration of their findings.
The point is, however, that the conclusion of lack of capacity to stand
trial is not tantamount to an acquittal of the accused, nor is it treated
as if he were found not guilty by reason of insanity. It merely postpones
the time at which a court will be permitted to inquire into the guilt or
innocence of the accused.
PARTIAL INSANITY
There is still another area in which an accused, although not so
mentally unsound as to be entitled to an acquittal, may nevertheless
receive consideration in the degree of his possible guilt. The military
recognizes and accepts the doctrine of partial responsibility by which
the accused's mental state or condition might be held to have affected
his capacity to form a specific intent in a crime wherein a specific intent
is an element of the offense.
Thus the court reasoned in United States v. Story24 that an impaired
mentality may affect one's mental capacity to premeditate, or to intend,
or to have whatever other state of mind is required for the offense
charged. This in turn may result in partial criminal responsibility. One
lacking the mental capacity to intend may be fully responsible for a
lesser crime that does not require such capacity, but only partially
responsible for a greater offense which does. In this sense, there may be
modified guilt or partial criminal responsibility.
Insanity which negatives criminal responsibility exists when an ac-
cused, because of a mental defect, disease or derangement, is unable,
concerning the offense charged, to know right from wrong or adhere to
the right. On the other hand, a lack of mental capacity to intend does
not completely absolve an accused, but it may eliminate a particular
element of the offense charged, such as premeditation, specific intent or
knowledge. and thereby reduce the gravity of the crime. For as the Smith
case pointed out, mental incapacity to intend may result from a disease
24 24 C.M.R. 596 (1957), 9 U.S.C.M.A. 162, 25 C.M.R. 424 (1958).
19621
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
of the mind short of insanity, or, unlike insanity, it may be the product
of a character or behavior disorder.
If an accused has a mental condition of the type and degree that
casts doubt upon his capacity to havethe state of mind required for the
offense charged, the cause of that condition is not of any particular
significance. A mental disease short of insanity, a character or behavior
disorder and drunkenness, are among the conditions that may cause a
lack of mental capacity to intend.25
Instructions on the effect of mental impairment short of legal insanity
are required if there is evidence from which reasonable men could conclude
that the accused was suffering from a condition which rendered him
incapable of entertaining the state of mind required for the offense
charged, regardless of how such condition was caused or by what name
it is designated.26
However, it is complete incapability of premeditating, intending,
knowing or having whatever other states of mind is essential, not merely
impaired capacity, that leads to partial criminal responsibility. Accord-
ingly, where there is affirmative evidence of mental capacity to intend,
albeit impaired or diminished, and no evidence of incapacity, no instruc-
tion on partial criminal responsibility is necessary.2
The leading military case on the defense of partial insanity is
United States v. Kunak.2 Although earlier cases had upheld the applica-
tion of the doctrine of partial insanity, this was the first case in which
the failure of the law officer to instruct on the subject resulted in a
reversal of a conviction. Kunak had been convicted of premeditated
murder and sentenced to death. He had urged the defense of lack of
mental responsibility. Notwithstanding expert testimony in favor of the
accused, the trial court and the Board of Review both found that the
evidence supported the findings of guilty and that the accused was
mentally responsible at the time of the shooting. However, since the
military allows a defense of mental disorder short of insanity in deter-
mining the accused's capacity to premeditate, and the court was not so
instructed, the conviction could not be sustained.
The case went to the court with instructions that the court could
not convict the accused if there was a reasonable doubt about his mental
responsibility. The Court of Military Appeals acknowledged that this
instruction was proper, but added,
25 United States v. Storey, 24 C.M.R. 596 (1957), 9 U.S.C.M.A. 162, 25 C.M.R.
424 (1958), citing United States v. Fleming, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 543, 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957),United States v. Dunnahoe, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 745, 21 C.M.R. 67 (1956), and United States
v. Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R. 346 (1954).
26 United States v. Galombos, 24 C.M.R. 621 (1957).
27 United States v. Storey, 24 C.M.R. 596 (1957), 9 U.S.C.M.A. 162, 25 C.M.R.
424 (1958).
28 17 C.M.R. 346 (1954).
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Significantly missing in this case is an instruction to the effect
that if in the light of all the evidence the court-martial had
reasonable doubt that the accused was mentally capable of
entertaining the premeditated design to kill involved in the offense
of premeditated murder, it could find the accused not guilty of
that degree of the crime.
29
Shortly before Kunak, the Court of Military Appeals had commented
on partial insanity in the Edwards case.3 0 This case also involved a con-
viction of premeditated murder. Here, however, the Court of Military
Appeals ruled that the facts presented did not warrant an instuction on
partial insanity, and therefore the failure to so instruct was not error. The
court, in stating that the issue of partial responsibility had not been
raised, said:
Medical evidence most favorable to him was that he possessed
a personality which made it a little more difficult to adhere to
the right. A mental capacity to adhere to the right may vary in
individuals but so long as a person is able to do so he is not
legally insane.3 '
In United States v. Dunnahoe32 the accused had a disorder described
as an "aggresive reaction." The Court of Military Appeals held that,
considering the nature and severity of the defect, the findings of guilty
of premeditated murder could not be affirmed in the absence of an
instruction to the members of the court that they, might consider the
evidence of his mental condition in determining the accused's capacity
to premeditate.33
BURDEN OF PROOF
For an issue of partial mental impairment to be reasonably raised,
an accused does not have the burden of establishing beyond a reasonable
doubt, or by greater weight of the evidence, that he was unable, by
reason of mental impairment, to entertain a required specific intent.
It is enough that there be evidence in the record, from whatever source,
from which a reasonable man could conclude that the accused's mental
condition was such that it would impair the capacity of the accused
to entertain a specific intent. If there is substantial evidence of mental
deficiency which might "interfere with," "diminish," "impair" or "lessen,"
an accused's capacity to premeditate, have knowledge, or entertain a
specific intent, an issue is reasonably raised which must be governed by
appropriate instructions.3 4 In order to acquit, because of lack of mental
29 Id. at 362.
3o United States v. Edwards, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 299, 15 C.M.R. 299 (1954).
a' Id. at 303.
82 6 U.S.C.M.A. 745, 21 C.M.R. 67 (1956).
as Note, 5 UTAH L. REv. 276 (1956).
8, United States v. Hemenway, 23 C.M.R. 810 (1956).
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capacity to intend, there need be no more than a reasonable doubt of
this capacity.
It may be observed, therefore, that insanity and incapacity to enter-
tain specific intent are two different defenses.35
Perhaps the clearest illustration of the distinction is found in United
States v. Burns.36 There it was shown how mental impairment has two
consequences as far as responsibility for crime is concerned. First, if it
is of a sufficient degree to prevent the accused from knowing right from
wrong or from adhering to the right, it will exonerate him completely
from criminal responsibility for his conduct. Second, if it is of a lesser
degree, it will not absolve him from all responsibility, but it may negative
the existence of a particular element of a crime so as to reduce it to a
lesser offense.
In Burns, the accused was convicted of assault with a dangerous
weapon and robbery. On the way to his quarters he found an iron
furnace shaker. As he passed the orderly room he saw the Charge ofQuarters asleep on a cot and he entered and beat him into unconsciousness
with the furnace handle. After he had knocked the victim unconscious,
he noticed his wallet and took it before leaving the room. All of the
psychiatrists who testified agreed that the accused knew right from wrong.
The prosecution psychiatrists further felt the accused was capable of
adhering to the right. However, the two defense doctors were of the
opinion that the accused was suffering from an acute psychotic episode
during the assault on the victim and that during the psychotic state the
accused was acting from irresistible impulse. However, they agreed that
the psychotic episode ended with the assault and did not encompass the
theft of the wallet. As a result it was held that the accused's impairment
reasonably raised an issue only with regard to the assault part of the
robbery charge. An instruction as to the effect of the accused's mental
condition was required only as a result of the assault. None was required
as to the larceny.
In summary then, on a trial for an offense involving a specific intent,
if there is sufficient evidence of mental impairment to raise an issue of
the accused's ability to entertain the specific intent involved and no
instructions are given on the effect of such mental impairment, only those
lesser included offenses which do not involve a specific intent can be
considered. 87
MENTAL DISORDERS AS MITIGATING FACTORS
Although a mental condition may not be such that it would operate
as a defense to an offense committed, it might well be a mitigating
85 United States v. Sommerville, 19 C.M.R. 655 (1955).se 5 U.S.C.M.A. 707, 19 C.M.R. 2 (1955).
37 United States v. Haas, 22 C.M.R. 868 (1956).
[Vol. 2
MILITARY IUSTICE
factor.81 One's mental capacity and intelligence may be such that he
should not be so severely punished as the cool, scheming offender. Thus
such evidence concerning the accused's mental condition should be con-
sidered by the court and presented prior to the sentence being voted upon.
This is so whether the matters were introduced as a defense to the
crime, or merely reserved as evidence presented in mitigation and
extenuation.
Two examples of the application are found in the cases of United
States v. MacReading9" and United States v. Block.
4
0
In MacReading, upon conviction of two absences without leave for
nine days and six days respectively, missing movements through neglect,
and breaking restriction, the accused was sentenced to a Bad Conduct
Discharge, confinement for four months, reduction in grade, and a for-
feiture of pay and allowances. Defense Counsel submitted evidence
showing that the accused had one year's service, and was only eighteen
years old. Further mitigation evidence showed that the accused had a
borderline mentality, emotional instability, and immature personality, plus
an extended period of hospitalization for related physical symptoms. The
members of the court-martial, in endorsing a petition for clemency, and
the Convening Authority in approving its legal officer's recommendation
with respect to clemency, made it plain there was no desire that the Bad
Conduct Discharge be executed. The Board of Review set aside the por-
tion calling for the Bad Conduct Discharge, obviously influenced by the
evidence of the character disorder.
In Block, the accused was convicted of escape from confinement,
wrongful appropriation of a motor vehicle, and three days absence
without leave. He received a sentence which included a Bad Conduct
Discharge. There was evidence that before his entry into the service he
had run away from several private schools, that he had blackouts and
behavior akin to fatigue, and that there was a history of epilepsy in
his family. It was held that under the circumstances a Bad Conduct
Discharge, which would separate the accused from the service in order
to punish him for his acts, was not correct punishment. An administrative,
rather than a punitive form of separation was deemed proper.
Similar results were reached in United States v. Sears,
4 1 and United
States v. Kelly.42 In the latter case, it was said that, although the accused
was legally sane, the true degree of his criminality and the correctness
of the sentence must be assessed in terms of his impaired ability to adhere
to the right.
And even more recently, it was held that in determining the appro-
38 Ibid.
39 20 C.M.R. 560 (1955).
40 18 C.M.R. 458 (1955).
41 22 C.M.R. 744 .(1956).
42 22 C.M.R. 723 (1956).
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priateness of a Bad Conduct Discharge, a Board of Review may properly
consider a post-trial neuropsychiatric report even though it was not part of
the record and even though it raises no issue as to the accused's sanity.4
The privilege of raising the issue is well preserved and at the pre-
sentencing stage the accused is allowed great leeway in apprising the
court of matters which for trial purposes might not have been relevant,
but for sentencing purposes will be. Recently a case was reversed because
the law officer neglected to respect this right.4
PRESUMPTION OP SANITY
As might be expected, the military will presume the sanity of the
accused.4 5 An accused is presumed to have been sane at the time of the
offense charged and at the time of trial, until a reasonable doubt of his
sanity at the time in question appears from the evidence.
Thus until the issue is challenged by the accused there is no reason
whatever for the government to prove sanity in their presentation. If
evidence tending to show insanity is introduced, and the members choose
to disbelieve such evidence, they may still consider the presumption
of sanity.46
In the military, the presumption of sanity is not evidence of sanity;
it is merely a permissible inference.47 As spelled out in the Manual:
The weight to be given to a presumption of this kind will depend
upon all the circumstances attending the proved facts which
give rise to the inference to be drawn from such facts. . . . In
making and weighing presumptions. . . members of course must
apply their common sense and their knowledge of human nature
and the ordinary affairs of life.4
A presumption in military law is normally to be construed as no more
than a principle of circumstantial evidence, which disappears only upon
the presentation of evidence that the trier of fact does not disbelieve.4
Additionally, an accused is also presumed to be capable of premedita-
tion. Therefore, unless the record establishes some impairment of the
ability to premeditate, an accused cannot complain because no instructions
were given on partial responsibility.
When the issue of sanity has been raised, the burden of proving the
sanity of the accused at the time of trial or the offense rests with the
prosecution." The presumption may perhaps outweigh the value of the
43 United States v. Gaskins, 26 C.M.R. 822 (1958).
44 United States v. Cook, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 579, 29 C.M.R. 395 (1960).
45 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 122b.
46 United States v. Johnson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 725, 14 C.M.R. 143 (1954).
47 United States v. Biesak, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 714, 14 C.M.R. 132 (1954).
48 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 138a.
49 United States v. Biesak, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 714, 14 C.M.R. 143 (1954).
50 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 122a.
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accused's evidence, but the burden is not on the accused to prove
insanity; it is rather on the prosecution to prove sanity, and to prove
it beyond a reasonable doubt. The only duty imposed on the accused
is that he produces sufficient evidence of insanity to place it in issue.
If he does this, then the government must prove sanity in the same
manner and to the same degree as it does other issues.
51
An instruction to the effect that an accused is presumed to be sane
until a reasonable doubt of sanity appears from the evidence, does not
improperly shift the burden of proof to the accused. There is no error
where the instructions as a whole advise that evidence tending to prove
insanity raises an issue of fact for determination by the court and
places the burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt on the
prosecution.
52
"Substantial" evidence must be introduced to raise the issue.
3 Cases
indicate, however, that the Court of Military Appeals will liberally
construe that requirement, and hence a law officer is well advised to
instruct on insanity whenever that issue has been fairly, though not
substantially, raised by the evidence. In the Biesak
54 case, a witness for
the defense, a hospital corpsman, testified that he did not consider the
accused to be insane "in the meaning of the word 'insane' itself." But
upon examination by a court member, the witness was asked if he thought
the accused was free from mental defect as to be able, concerning the
particular actions charged, to distinguish right from wrong and to adhere
to the right. The witness replied, "I don't feel that he was, Sir, when I
saw him at least." A prosecution witness, the psychiatrist who examined
the accused the next day, offered the opinion that the accused was able
to distinguish right and wrong with respect to the acts charged, and to
adhere to the right. Clearly, the Court of Military Appeals could under-
stand why a court might prefer to believe the psychiatrist more than the
corpsman. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that the testimony of the
corpsman raised the issue of insanity enough so as to require instructions
by the law officer.
Shortly afterwards the court set aside another conviction wherein
the charge on insanity was not given to the court.
5 5 At the trial the
accused's mother testified as a witness and indicated that the accused's
behavior prior to entering the Marine Corps during World War II had
been normal in all respects. She further remarked that following his
discharge in 1945 she had noticed a marked change in his personality.
51 United States v. Burns, 9 C.M.R. 707 (1952), 2 U.S.C.M.A. 400, 9 C.M.R. 30(1953).
52 United States v. Henderson, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 556, 29 C.M.R. 372 (1960).
53 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, 1951, para. 122b.
54 United States v; Biesak, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 714, 14 C.M.R. 132 (1954).
5 United States v. Loof, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 36, 15 C.M.R. 132 (1954).
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He was "completely irresponsible," she told the court, as he would
sometimes leave home on an errand and not return for several days.
When he returned from such trips he claimed he had no idea of where
he had been. His mother believed that he did not know right from wrong.
Other defense evidence showed that after the accused received chemical
burns and blast concussion wounds during World War II, his personality
changed to the extent that he became meloncholy and developed a feeling
of hatred toward others. Expert psychiatric evidence was to the effect
that the accused was suffering from an "emotional disorder" but could
distinguish right from wrong at the time of the alleged offense.
The Court of Military Appeals determined that although the psychi-
atric evidence (if believed over that of the mother) would result in a
conclusion of sanity and that the evidence in his behalf may have come
from a biased source, nevertheless these matters ought to have been
weighed by the court in order to determine whether the degree of his
mental disorder at the time of the offense did in fact constitute insanity.
Regardless of how the court would probably have ruled, the evidence
was held sufficient to raise the issue of insanity, and since it had not
been instructed upon, the conviction was reversed.
In United States v. Schatzinger,6 the confession of the accused con-
tained the following statement: "I was sitting there a moment and I had
the funniest feeling to kill someone and she happened to be next to me.
I started choking her not realizing what I was doing. I had a haze in
front of my eyes and after a few minutes it cleared away and I saw
that I had choked a woman." There was no motion for a mental examina-
tion of the accused and the accused did not specifically raise the issue
of mental responsibility. The law officer did not consider the issue raised
and did not instruct on it. Nor did the trial board or defense counsel
argue or consider insanity. The Court of Military Appeals ruled that
the presumption of sanity remains until it is rebutted by substantial evi-
dence tending to prove the accused is insane, and that the statement of
the accused was not of such a nature that it raised an issue as to whether
he was suffering from mental defect, disease or derangement. Accordingly,
the prosecution was not required to prove sanity.
CONCLUSION: TEST IN JEOPARDY
It is clearly not enough to merely recite that the military's test for
insanity is M'Naghten and irresistible impulse, rather than Durham. For,
as illustrated by the cases, many factual situations arise which, even
though not constituting a complete defense to the crime charged, will
nevertheless influence a court's determination as to the degree of guilt
and the grade of sentencing. Essentially this is the present status of
the law.
9 C.M.R. 586 (1953).
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Nevertheless, the solidarity of leading cases such as Smith and Kunak
are presently in jeopardy. In United States v. Currens,57 a case decided
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals on May 1, 1961, the court
reversed a conviction under the National Motor Vehicle Theft Act, the
so-called Dyer Act. The basis for reversal was the failure of the court
below to adopt a test which conformed with today's knowledge of medical
science, and, in particuar, to adopt the test that "the jury must be satisfied
that at the time of committing the prohibited act the defendant, as a
result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to conform
his conduct to the requirements of the law which he is alleged to have
violated." This test was drawn from Part I of the test proposed by the
American Law Institute in its Model Penal Code.
Why then, if Durham has been rejected by the military, will this case
be of any consequence? It is submitted that one line of reasoning is the
theory that the offense is not a District of Columbia offense, but one
under the United States Code. The Supreme Court treated Durham
merely as if the highest court of a state had issued its pronouncement on
substantive law. Here, however, the court is not sitting as a state court,
but rather as a federal court on a federal offense.
The Supreme Court, therefore, must pass upon the Currens test as
the rule in the federal courts. If they reject it, then all other federal
courts should be bound thereby on federal offenses. If the Currens test
is upheld, however, little imagination is required to see that some military
lawyer will ask for a similar charge for an accused when the offense is
federal in nature rather than state. Recalling that the military test is not
in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but rather in the Manual for
Courts-Martial, it is not hard to see that the entire test is a federal inter-
pretation of a federal law, the same as that in the Currens case.
The effect of the law which appeared fixed by the Smith case now
becomes curiously doubtful. The Currens rule will no doubt be asserted,
and the resulting interpretations by courts of military appeal could very
easily improve the standards deemed acceptable to date as a defense
in the military when insanity is raised as an issue.
V 290 F.2d 751 (1961).
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